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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT

L1~KE CITY, a municipal

corpora bon,

Plaintiff-Respo 11de11 t,
vs.

)
, Case No.
)/ 11141

STATE OF UTAH,
Def end ant-. \ppcllr1 nt.
I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF N A'l'URE OF CASE
I

This is an action filed by Salt Lake City under
the declaratory judgment act against the State of Utah
to determine the legal status of an 1890 and a 1926
"agreement" by Salt Lake City to provide free water
to the territory of Utah and State of Utah, respectively,
for use upon the buildings and grounds of the State
Capitol.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As in appellant's brief, the respondent, Salt Lake
City, in this brief will be ref erred to as the City, the ter.
ritory of Utah as the Territory and the State of Utah as
the State.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The statement of the disposition in the lower court
as set forth in appellant's brief is correct, except that
appellant uses the words "grant of water", rather than
a "grant of free use of water", the latter phrase appear·
ing to be factually correct.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff and respondent seeks an affirmance
of the summary judgment and decree granted it in the
court below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
'Vhile it is true that this case was submitted to
the lower court on the basis of stipulated facts, which
included three ( 3) exhibits, all of which are in th,e
record on this appeal, there is one "fact" in appellants
"summarization" of these facts with which respondent
cannot agree.
On page four ( 4), first paragraph at the top .01
the page, the appellant in its brief takes argumentatJ\'e
2
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liberties with the stipulated facts in saying, "as a part
of this same arrangement and in order to carry out
certain of the conditions in the deed, the City also
granted the State (Territory) the use of water for
the grounds and buildings located thereon."
The record actually shows that the 1888 grant of
]and by the City to the Territory on which land was
to be built the capitol building did in fact require the
Territory to use said land as a capitol site and to park
and beautify said grounds, nothing being said in the
deed of grant with regards to the water to be required
for such purpose. These facts further show that no mention was made of the needed water until two years later
when the Territorial Legislature enacted the legislation, (R 11), appropriating the sum of $10,000.00 to
be used to improve the capitol grounds, provided the
City furnish free water for said grounds.
As to the remainder of appellant's Statement of
Facts, they appear to be correct and accurate and devoid
of any legal editorializing.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE RESPECTIVE AGREEMENTS MADE
WITH REFERENCE TO FURNISHING
FREE \V ATER WITHOUT TIME LIMITATION ARE ULTRA VIRES AND HENCE

YOID.

3
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POINT II.
THE AGREEMENT OF 1890 TO FURNISH
FREE 'VATER WAS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY, WHICH POLICY WAS DECLARED
IN 'VRITING AND EMBODIED IN ARTICLE
XI, SECTION 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITl:.
TION, AND IS THEREFORE VOID.
POINT III.
THE AGREEMENT OF 1926 TO EXTEND
THE USE OF FREE 'V ATER TO "ADDITIOXAL LANDS" WAS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XI, SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THEREFORE VOID.
POINT IV.
THE AGREEMENT BY THE CITY TO
PROVIDE THE TERRITORY FREE USE OF
ITS 'VATER WAS NOT A GRANT OF A
WATER RIGHT BUT MERELY AN ABOR·
TIVE ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO A COX·
TRACT TO PROVIDE WATER FREE OF
CHARGE 'VHICH AGREEMENT WAS VOID
FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
POINT V.
THE CITY HOLDS ITS 'VATER RIGHT~
AND REGULATES ITS WATER RATES L

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APOSITION OF TRUST FOR THE USE AND
BENEFIT OF ITS RESIDENTS TO BE DIS'f RIB UTE D AT EQUAL RATES, AND,
THEREFORE, SO ACTS IN A STRICT GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY, WHEREBY IT
CANNOT LOSE SUCH WATER RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHTS TO DISTRIBUTE ITS WATER
AT EQUAL RATES BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES
OR ADVERSE USE OF ITS WATER BY
THIRD PARTIES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RESPECTIVE AGREEMENTS MA.DR
WITH REFERENCE TO FURNISHING
FREE \VATER WITHOUT TIME LIMITATION ARE ULTRA VIRES AND HENCE
VOID.
"The established rule (of law) is that municipal corporations have no power to make contracts which will embarrass or control them in
the performance of their legislative powers and
duties." McQuillin on Municipal Corporations,
1966 Revised Volume, Volume 10, Section 29.07,
p. 245.
This same treatise in said section 29.07 goes on to
state:
"So, power conferred upon a city to contract
respecting a particular matter does not confer
power, by implication, so to contract with reference thereto as to embarrass and interfere with

5
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~ts future control over the matter, as the public
mterests may reqmre. Hence, all contracts which
inter/ ere with the legislative or governmental
functions of the municipality are absolutely
void."
·

A most interesting case from this jurisdiction,
involving this question, is that of Warm Springs Co.
v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 P. 788. In that case
the city leased premises to plaintiff's assignor within
city limits, which premises were comprised of a warm
springs bath facility and a saloon for bar purposes,
both premises leasing for $200.00 per month. Plaintiff
and assignee operated the bathing facility but sublet
the saloon for $100.00 per month, operating thus frorn
1906 to 1911 when the city passed an ordinance pursuant
to state statute excluding the saloon premises from the
district in which intoxicating liquors might be sold.
Thereafter the plaintiff paid the $200.00 monthly
rentals under protest and in 1916 plaintiff presented
its claim to the city for $5,700.00, which claim the city
denied. The court denied the plaintiff's right to recover
back the rentals paid under protest, stating as follows:

"If the city had entered into a lease in which
it had guaranteed the plaintiff the right to con·
tinue the saloon business in the teeth of chapter
106, the lease to that effect would have been void.
T¥hat could not be accomplished directly, there·
fore, cannot be accomplished indir_ectly . · : I~
this case the act bv the citv which 1s complame
of was governme~tal act, ·and hence the,, city 1'
not liable for the consequences of the act. (Em·
phasis added.)

6
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By analogy, if a City Commission in the instant
case had purported to lease in perpetuity a water right
to the Territory (and later to the State), thus attempting to deprive future City Commissions of the power
to regulate the sale of water to its inhabitants, surely
such lease in perpetuity would, under the reasoning and
the rule of the 'Varm Springs Co. case be held void.
Such was the ruling of the court in the case of Belcher
Sugar Refining Co. vs. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co.,
101 Mo. 192, 13 S.W. 822, wherein it was held that
where a city has the right to lease a part of its wharf
for the purpose of a warehouse and grain elevator, it
must reserve the right to terminate such lease whenever
the public interest demands such action.
Along these same lines, and very much in point and
on all fours with the facts in the instant dispute is the
case of City Council of Augusta vs. Richmonil County,
9134, 178 Ga. 400, 173 S.E. 140. In that case the plaintiff county brought action against defendant city to
enjoin the city from cutting off water supplied by city
to county courthouse for the past 40 years or more.
The city and the county had jointly occupied the courthouse and grounds from 1820 to 1890 when, pursuant
to an equitable proceeding in court, an agreement was
entered into between the county and the then Mayor
of the City which in part provided:
"The city council shall furnish all water necessary to run fountains, water closets, and for all
other purposes to the county, free of rent."

7
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Thereafter, for a period of forty-three years the
city did furnish free water to the county as provided
in said agreement. In applying the law to the abore
stated facts the Supreme Court of Georgia in reversing
the lower court, stated:
"\Ve cannot concur in the judgment rendered
by the court 1Jelow. \Ve do not think that the
municipality could make a binding contract to
furnish water free of charge for an indefinite
time in the future, for the purpose mentioned in
the contract referred to. 1'he agreement rnade in
reference to furnishing water without charge on
the part of the cit/j was ultra vires, and could
not be enforced as against subsequent council!
of the municipality." (Emphasis added.)
A case from another jurisdiction, the State of
Illinois, which further explains the law relating to a
municipal corporation's lack of power to contract away
its water and water rights, (and this without the benefit
of a constitutional prohibition such as we have in this
state) is that of Eastern Illinois State Normal School
vs. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, lll N.E. 573. In
that case the city owned and operated a waterworks
plant and system and as an inducement to procure the
location of the school at said city the City Council
adopted a resolution which provided that if the school
located within the city's limits the city would furnish
water to the school for the consideration of five dollars
for a period of fifty years. The court held that the cit)·
had no power to make such a contract and said contract
was void and could not be enforced.

8
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In the case of Shannon v. Huron, 9 S.D. 356, 69
~.W. 598, plaintiff sought to enforce payment of certain
warrants issued by the city in payment of debts due
for printing certain bills, pamphlets, circulars, letterheads and envelopes, at the instance of persons who
had been selected at a public meeting to compose a
committee for the purpose of bringing forward the
City of Huron as a candidate for the capitol of the
State of South Dakota. The court held the warrants
void, saying:

"The constitution of this state, legally adopted
and ratified, was in full force at the time plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the capitol
committee to do the printing for which three of
the warrants in the suit were afterwards issued
directly to plaintiffs; and article 10 of section
2 thereof provides that 'no tax or assessment shall
be levied or collected, or debts contracted by
municipal corporations, except in pursuance of
law for public purposes specified by law.' The
location of the state capitol for the benefit of
private individuals was a matter wholly foreign
to the purposes and objects of the corporation,
the charter of which neither expressly nor by
implication authorized any of its officers to burden the municipality with debts incurred in furtherance of the scheme; and the city was entirely
powerless to issue its warrants therefor. Plaintiffs, the capitol committee, and all other persons
dealing with the officers of the municipality, had
notice and were charged with a knowledge of the
law, under the limitations and restrictions of
which no liability could be created or debt incurred against the city of Huron for printing

9
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capitol campaign literature, and the warrants
when issued, were void in toto."
'
The application of law in the Shannon case to the
matter before this court clearly points out the fact that
when the city fathers purported to provide (for an
indefinite period) free water to the Territory of Utah,
such act was beyond the power and authority of the
municipality and such an arrangement was void in toto
as the court stated. in the Shannon case.
POINT II.
THE AGREEMENT OF 1890 TO FURNISH
FREE "\VATER WAS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY, WHICH POLICY WAS DECLARED
IN "\VRITING AND EMBODIED IN ARTICLE
XI, SECTION 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND IS THEREFORE VOID.
In the year 1895, pursuant to the authority of
the Enabling Act passed by the Congress of the United
States, delegates were elected to serve in the Consti·
tutional Convention of Utah. These delegates discussed
at some length the article of the proposed Constitution
which had reference to municipal corporations, and the
part which concerned them most was Section 6 of
Article XI, as adopted, and which reads as follows:
"Sec. 6. [Municipalities forbidden to sell water·
works or rights J No municipal corporation, shall
directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispo~;
of any waterworks, water rights, or sources

10
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water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or
controlled by it; but all such waterworks, water
rights and sources of water now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall he preserved, maintained and operated
by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at
reasonable charges: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent
any such municipal corporation from exchanging
water-rights, or sources of water supply, for other
water-rights or sources of water supply of equal
value, and to be deYoted in like manner to the
public supply of its inhabitants."

It is interesting to read these proceedings and the
record of this discussion for it clearly portrays the thinking of those men and the foresight they exercised in
recognizing the need for declaring in writing the public
policy of this state with reference to the sacred trust
in which cities hold their water for the benefit of their
inhabitants.
On page 672, first column, of Volume I, Proceedings, Constitutional Convention 1890, Utah, one of the
delegates, a Mr. S. A. Thurman, in discussing Section
6 as it reads above, stated:
" . . . I think the amendment (deleting the
phrase 'water at reasonable charges)' ought to
prevail, 'water at reasonable charges.' Now, I
take the position that if we leaYe the balance of
the section star~d, requirin,r; cities to hold ihis
property (ownership and control of water rights
and water supply) w; a trust for the benefit of
the inhabitants to supply them with water, the
courts will always construe the question of a

11
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reasonable charge, because it will be a trust fixed
and formed by the constitution for the purpose of
supplying the people with water, ... " (emphasis
added)
As hereinafter stated, on the basis of the historv
and the law, it is respondent's contention that Artie!~
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Con'3titution was a written
declaration of the commo~1 law existing in the Territory
of Utah prior thereto and specifically when the 1890
agreement to furnish free water was made.
In Am. J ur. 2d, Vol. 16, page 270 and 271,Section
87, under the heading Circumstances Attending Adoption of Provisions; Existing Conditions and History,
on page 271, is the following statement:
"A constitutional provision must be presumed
to have been framed and adopted in the light
and understanding of prior and existing laws
and with reference to them, and, like a statute,
is properly to be expounded in the light of coruli·
tions existing at the time of its adoption, the
general spirit of the times, and the prevailing
sentiments among the people." (emphasis added)
The court's attention is also called to a statement
in C.J.S., Constitutio1Ull Law, Volume 16, page 116,
Section 36, under the heading, Construction With Ref·
erence to Common Law, wherein it is stated:
"In the absence of a clear intention to the con·
trary, a constitution is generally to be constr~ed
in the light of the common law, since there 15 a
presumption that no change in the common Jaw
was intended.

12
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"Since a constitution is not the beginning of
law in the state, it assumes the existence of a
well understood system of law which is to remain
in force."
The court is fully aware of the history of the arid
west, and particularly of the history of the Territory
and State of Utah; that the early pioneers and settlers
of this arid region realized that water was the life blood
of their civilization and that particularly for cities and
towns to grow, it would be necessary to zealously guard
and protect the water rights of such cities and towns
with a sacred trust against any political or economic
maneuvering by elected officials which could in the
future jeopardize and irreparably injure the residents
of any such city or town; that when the framers of
our constitution met and drafted it they expressed in
Article XI, Section 6, the common law as it had existed
in this Territory up to that time; and, finally, that the
constitution when adopted did, therefore, not change
the law of the State of Utah which now expressly prohibits, and in 1890 did impliedly prohibit, cities and
towns from alienating or giving away in perpetuity
any of their water or water rights and that said constitutional provision was a written declaration of such
basic common law as did previously exist in this State
when a Territory.
POINT III.
THE AGREEMENT OF 1926 TO EXTEND

THE USE OF FREE WATER TO "ADDITION13

1
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AL LANDS" 'VAS IN VIOLATION OF AR.
TICLE XI, SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CON.
STITUTION AND THEREFORE VOID.

The meaning of Article XI, Section 6 of the Uta!i
Constitution (supra) appears to be absolutely clear
and unequivocal. However, this Honorable court was
asked to render an interpretation of this constitutional
provision in the case of Hyde Park Town v. Chambers, ,
99 Utah ll8, 104 P.2d 220, which case dealt with the
power or right of a city or town to alienate any of its
water rights in light of the above constitutional prol'i·
sion. The town of Hyde Park purported to exchange
a water right or a right in perpetuity to free use of
the town's water for a right of way for its water main,
which transaction this court held to be in violation of
Article XI, § 6, supra, as an abortive attempt to alienate
the water rights of a city or town. This court stated:
"We are of the opinion that the contract is void as
contended by the town," (the Town's contention was
that this contract was void as in violation of Article
XI, § 6, (supra).
1

The application of the law as rendered in the Hyde
Park Town case would clearly make void and unen· '
forceable the purported agreement entered into in 1926
between the City and the State.
There is no logical reason in the law why a state,
as a party, should have any greater right to violate
. · · and ·
its own constitution with respect to su bd1v1s10ns
municipalities of that state than would private indt· '

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

riduals or any other party. There should be no question,
therefore, but that the State of Utah was bound, and
still is bound, by its own constitutional limitations in its
contractual relationships with others, including a city
of that state.

e
!:

15
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The State next advances the conclusion that the
City's 1926 agreement to furnish free water to an
additional 20 acres of land which the State added to
the original capitol site was "No more than a clarification of the 1890 grant." Instead of being a clarification of the 1890 promi~e to "grant" free use of city
water, this agreement actually purported to extend
the terms of the former "grant" of free water to the
additional land. 'Vhy was a clarification of the original
promise necessary or required? Free water had been
delivered under the original promise for about 36 years
without question. No problem of construction or interpretation of the original promise had arisen that needecl
clarification. The fact is the State had acquired additional lands to add to the capitol grounds and persuaded the City to furnish free water to these grounds
· the same as the City was furnishing free water to the
original capitol site. Such a "grant" of free city water
1
could not relate back and be a part of or in any way
'· clarify the original "grant". It was a brand new promise
to furnish additional water without charge to additional
kind, but made, we submit, in violation of Section 6,
Article XI of the State Constitution and was, for that
, reason, void.

~~ 1
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POINT IV.

THE AGREEMENT BY THE CITY TO
PROYIDE THE TERRITORY FREE USE OF
ITS 'VATER WAS NOT A GRANT OF A
WATER RIGHT BUT MERELY AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT TO PROVIDE WATER FREE OF I
CHARGE WHICH AGREEMENT WAS VOID!
FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.

1

Historically, the arrangement for the City to fur·
nish free water for the grounds and any building erected
thereon was an after-thought and was not related to,
nor a part of, the consideration for the State Capitol
being located in Salt Lake City.
The State first argues that the conveyance of the
Capitol site to the Territory and the later granting
of free water to the capitol grounds commission were
one arrangement or transaction. We maintain that this
is no more than a fortuitous assumption, wholly fallacious and contrary to the stipulated facts. w·e shall
demonstrate this by the following detailed reference to
the facts as stipulated.
The deed to the Capitol site was dated May 1.
1888. It provides:
"To have and to hold the above granted prem·
ises, with appurtenances, and every part thereo~
unto the said party of the second part · · · .fo
the erection and maintenance of the capitof1
buildings of Utah Territory or future state 0
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Utah and the proper appurtenances and surroundings, including a reservoir to said capitol
buildings and grounds."
It provided further as a condition to the grant, "that
a portion of said land not actually devoted to buildings
as aforesaid be improved and cultivated as a public
park."

1

At the 1888 Session of the Territorial Legislatur1:,
according to the certificate by C. A. Tingey, Secretary
of State, (page 5, Exhibit "A"), it passed an Act,
Chapter 28, creating a board of commissioners on capitol
grounds, "to take possession and control of the grounds
conveyed by the city of Salt Lake to the Territory of
Utah ... to grade, fence, improve," the same.
The Territorial Legislature approved an appropriation March 13, 1890, Chapter XXXIX, Item 52,
which provided "for the improvement of capitol grounds
to be drawn and expended under the supervision of the
capitol commission, $10,000.00, provided that the above
amount be expended on the condition that Salt Lake
City furnish, free of charge, sufficient water for said
grounds and for the building proposed to be erected
thereon." (Paragraph 3, page 2, stipulation of facts.)
The Board of Commissioners on Capitol Grounds,
under date of April 29, 1890, in a letter to Salt Lake
City, called attention to the lack of funds in the Territorial treasury to pay its share of the cost of the reservoir,
asking the city to pay its share. The letter further
stated that the late Legislature appropriated $10,000.00
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for improvement of the grounds with the proviso that
the city furnish water without charge for the grounds
and any building erected thereon, "as this was specifically understood with the city when arrangements were
made to begin the work." (Meaning the work of improving the grounds.) (Paragraph 4, page 4, Stipulation of facts.) (Emphasis added.)
The City on receipt of this letter under date of
May 6, 1890, passed the resolution to furnish water
without charge for use on the capitol grounds and buildings. This resolution reads:
"WHEREAS, the late Legislature appropriated th~ sum of $10,000 for improvement of the
Capitol Grounds with the proviso that the city
furnish water without charge for the grounds
and any building erected thereon.
"BE IT RESOLVED that the free use of
water be granted to the Commission for the use
of the Capitol Grounds and for the use of any
buildings erected thereon in accordance with the
specific understanding with the City when the
arrangements were made to begiJn work on said
grounds." (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing it is clear that the matter of
furnishing free water was an afterthought, a unilateral
condition imposed by the Legislature as a string to
the appropriation of $10,000.00 to improve the Capitol
Grounds and came solely as a result of the action of
the Legislature in this respect and had nothing to do
with the prior grant of the Capitol site. It also appears
that this grant of free water was negotiated when the
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Capitol Grounds Commission began the work of improving the grounds and not before. This condition was
not mentioned in the deed conveying the land to the
Territory or as one of the several conditions contained
in the deed under which and subject to which the land
was conveyed for Capitol Grounds purposes. It was
not until two years later when the Legislature appropriated $10,000.00 to improve the land and the work
of improvement began that the furnishing of water,
free or otherwise, was raised. If there had been any
agreement prior to the appropriation of $10,000.00 that
the City would furnish free water there would be no
need for this proviso in the appropriation; The undisputed fact is that it was not until the Capitol Commission commenced work of improving the grounds
after the Legislature had appropriated money therefor
that the City agreed to furnish free water. The deed
had already been executed and recorded.
Under the terms of the deed the Territory was
bound to improve the grounds not used for buildings
for a public park at its own expense. The deed also
provided for the construction of a reservoir to supply
water to the Capitol Grounds, the City and Territory
each to pay one-half of the cost. No mention was made
of free water, ilthough the matter of water was con~idered in providing for a reservoir. It is curious indeed
that this item of free water was not mentioned in the
deed along with the reservoir and other conditions if
' it was a part of the original transaction. It was not
until the Board on Capitol Grounds was ready to im-
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prove the land and an appropriation of $10,000.00 for
that purpose was made that the matter of free water
first arose. When the Legislature appropriated thal
su1n for the improvement of the ground,s, it did only
that which it was already obligated to do under tne
express terms of the deed, namely, improve the grounds
not used for buildings for a public park. If the Territory
failed to use this money and improve the grounds it
would be in violation of the terms of the deed even if
the City demanded payment for the water. The conclusion is inescapable that there was, and is, no con·
sideration at all for the grant of free water by the City.
The obligation to improve the grounds as a public park
already rested upon the State by the terms of the deed.
In granting free water the City simply acceded to the
demand of the Legislature (which the learned trial
judged observed amounted to legislative "extortion")
that it furnish free water when the $10,000.00 appro·
priation was made to improve the Capitol Grounds,
an obligation which already rested upon the Territorr
under the terms of the City's deed.
Although in its resolution the City Council of Salt
Lake City used the word "granted'', this word must be
understood in light of the full context of the resolution
of l\Iay 6, 1890. The court's attention is called to the
specific language of said resolution wherein the council
said "That the free use of water be granted to the Coro·
mission for the use of the Capitol grounds and for the
use of any building erected thereon ... " It is clear fr~m
this language that it was never the intent of the City
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fathers to "grant" to the Territory any water right of
any description, kind or nature. A water right, as the
court is well aware, is in legal formalities considered
realty. A grant of a water right, therefore, must needs
carry with it in accordance with the laws of the State
of Utah all of the necessary requisites of a conveyance
of real property. Certainly, the appellant does not claim
that the resolution of May 6, 1890, complies with such
requirements and could in anywise purport to be an
actual grant of a water right. There is nothing in said
resolution which describes the nature of the water, the
u.Ye of which is "granted", nor is there any reference
to the point of diversion or to the quantity of any such
water. The resolution, on its face, clearly shows that
the intent of the City Council was only to allow the
Territory to take water belonging to the City and use
it without being charged therefor. Such use was permissive and no rights under the law can be or ever
could be obtained in perpetuity to such water on the
theory that the Territory obtained a "grant" of water
from the City. The best that could be said for the
"right" of the Territory is that it obtained a right to
afree water supply, which it did not and could not do,
rather than a water right. In the case of Boyce v. Killip,
184 Ore. 424, 198 P.2d 613, the Supreme Court of
the State of Oregon held that the terms "water supply"
and "water right" generally do not have the same connotation, the latter term meaning generally the right
to divert water by artificial means from a natural
stream or spring, and that where the parties had claimed
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a right to divert water, not from a stream or spring, but
from a pipe which was part of a water system origin11t.
ing at a stream, there was a right to a "water supplH
rather than a "water right".

The position of the State in claiming a "grantef i
I
water right appears unfounded in law and in fact. Salt
Lake City in effect "grants" to each and every resident
of the city a right to take water from its water system.
but this implied right or grant certainly does not gin
the City resident any "granted" right to obtain !ht
water flowing in the city's mains without payment
therefor. There is no reason in the law or under the
facts of this case why the State should stand in any
more favored position from a financial standpoint than
any other person within the confines of Salt Lake City.

Futhermore, the source of supply of water whicl1
the City has delivered into the distribution system of
the State for the last 77 years has been and alwap
will be water belonging to Salt Lake City. The water
does not come under the control of the State for it1
use and benefit until it leaves the water mains of the
City, nor has the State acquired any right, whatsoev.er.
in this water until it leaves the water mains of the C1~·
and flows into the distribution system of the State. At I
I
that point the water belongs to the State of Utah, not :
by reason of any water right thereto, but because the I
City has physically connected its water mains witli I
those of the State, allowing this water to flow into the I
State's distribution system and the only question ii

I
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whether or not the State by reason of the agreements
of 1890 and 1926 should be exempt from paying the
City for said water used by it the same as any other
private user. \Vhen understood in this light, this case
is clearly one to determine whether or not the City
fathers under the basic common law and later the constitutional prohibition had any power whatsoever to
enter into such an agreement to deliver to the Territory
and later the State of Utah free water which, under
a sacred trust, belonged to, and was to be held for,
the use and benefit of the residents of Salt Lake City.
The court's attention is called once again to the discussion of the delegates to the Utah Constitution Con' vention as regards Article XI, Section 6 (supra). Most
of their fears were directed to the question of cities
and towns in the State using their water systems in an
equitable manner so that all the users thereof would be
charged fair, equitable, and equal rates for the water
used. In light of this discussion it would appear a clear
violation of the intent of the framers of our constitution to allow the State of Utah as one of the users
of that water to violate the spirit of this constitution.
Particularly is this true where the facts clearly indicate
that the 1890 arrangement "granted" to the Territory
only the free use of the City's water rather than a clear
grant of a water right out of a stream or other source
of that water.

In view of the foregoing law and facts it is clear
that the State of Utah has acquired no right whatsoever
to the use of the City water by a grant of a water right.
23
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One of the cases cited by the appellant is the ca1,,
of City of Big Spring, 389 S.W.2d 533, 404 S.W.i,:
810, wherein a court upheld the validity of a contrati
in which the City agreed to deliver free water to 1i
hospital so long as it remained and was operated w
the said city. This case is of little value to prove tn1
defendant's point for the reason that Texas does no:,
appear to recognize the common law of the State m
Utah, nor lvis it ever by any constitutional provisio'.
declared any such conduct of the City Council to 01!
invalid. Furthermore, the City in that case receiveJI
the consideration that the hospital would be locatedmi
said city to the benefit of the city in exchange for tl1t\
water. Under the facts of the instant case the ci~'
received absolutely no benefit from the Territory for
the free water which the city agreed to deliver as ha1
been discussed under this Point IV of this brief.
POINT V.

THE CITY HOLDS ITS \VATER RIGHT~
AND REGULATES ITS WATER RATES IX
A POSITION OF TRUST FOR THE USE AXD
BENEFIT OF ITS RESIDENTS TO BE DIS·
TR I BUTE D AT EQUAL RATES, A~H
THEREFORE, SO ACTS IN A STRICT GOY.
ERNMENTAL CAPACITY, \VHEREBY IT
CANNOT LOSE SUCH\VATERRIGHTSAXD
THE RIGHTS TO DISTRIBUTE ITS WATEr I
AT EQUAL RATES BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES

I
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OR ADVERSE USE OF ITS
THIRD PARTIES.

WATER BY

In the case of City Council of Augusta vs. RichmoM Cownty, (supra) the court cites from the case of
Horkan vs. City of Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 71 S.E.
785, wherein the court in the latter case says:
"A council of a municipality cannot make a
binding contract by which it undertakes to obligate the municipality to furnish 'free of charge',
for an indefinite time in the future, sufficient
water for the closets in a given building situated
within the corporate limits, in consideration of
the owner of the building allowing the municipality to lay its sewers through the land. Such a
contract, being ulta vires and void, could not be
ratified by the continued use, under the contract
of the sewer through the land by the municipality; nor would the benefit thereby received estop
it from subsequently setting up the invalidity
of the contract.' In the opinion Chief Justice
Fish said: 'We have found no case, however, that
would tend to support a contract made by a city
council in behalf of the municipality to furnish
water indefinitely to one of its citizens, in consideration of his permitting it to lay a sewer
through his land. Succeeding councils would
necessarily have the power, we think, to change
the water rates from time to time as circumstances might require or justify, in order to obtain
sufficient revenue to maintain its waterworks
system on the one hand, and, on the other, in
order to serve all its patrons at reasonable rates
and on equal terms. To allow one council to
legally bind the city by a contract of the kind
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here in question might so tie the hands of it·
successors as to res wt in great injury to the mu
nicipality and to the public. * * * Power in .
municipality of maldng and changing, by ord I
1

nance, water rates from time to time, whenett,i
necessary to protect the city in its revenues ai1,1.
to enable it to furnish to all on equal terrns mw
at reasonable prices, is a legislative or govm
mental power, and the ref ore cannot be legal/1i
bargained or bartered away by one council, .i•
as to .fnrever dqJri'l'e succeeding councils of 1111
right to exercise it." (Emphasis added).
Of further interest is the disposition which tha!
court made with regards to the argument that the Ci~
having received the consideration, (the locating of tht
school within the city limits) was estopped to dispute
the validity of the contract even though it had no pmrn
to enter into the said contract in the first instance. Tl1t
court answered this claim by stating:
"Every one is presumed to know the extent uf
the powers of a municipal corporation, and ii

cannot be estoppecl to aver its incapacity, whicl1

would amount to conferring power to do un·
authorized acts simply because it has done them
and received the consideration stipulated there·
for." (Emphasis added.)

It may be argued that Salt Lake City operate' j
its water system in a proprietary capacity and that : '
therefore, none of the cases heretofore cited would be
applicable law to the facts of this case. Such a position
is "·ithout any legal basis whatsoever. Our Suprenie :
111
Court has already ruled in the case of Brummitt, et
1
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v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33 Ut. 289, 93 P. 828, as
follows:
"That the fixing and regulating of water rates
is a governmental function and cannot be surrendered nor suspended by the city council is
agreed to by all concerned in this action." (Emphasis added.)
1lunicipalities in this State, therefore, cannot enter into
ralid and binding contracts with regard to the rates
for services rendered to the public. The right to regulate
and fix rates cannot be surrendered. The court in the
Brummitt case goes on to say:
"In short, while a municipality cannot impair
the obligation of its contract under the guise of
exercising its police power, yet it canp.ot surrender or barter away its police powers under
the guise of making a contract ... We are constrained to hold, therefore, that the agreement
fixing the rates for the entire period of the contract cannot be upheld; that the city council had
the right to agree upon and fix temporary rates;
... that the city council cannot delegate its duty
to regulate, fix, and maintain reasonable rates,
but that it must exercise this power and duty in
that regard whenever the rates are or become
excessive and unreasonable."

'' \

Another Utah case in which the court has spoken
clearly on the law with regards to the fixing and regu1e
laiing of rates for city services is the case of City of
in St. George v. Public Utilities Commission, 62 Ut. 453,
ie , Z20 P. 720. In that case the city had a contract with the
1
i!. Power Company to provide free light service to the

t.

1
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city. The Power Compa11y asked the Public Sen11
Commission for a change in rates, which change 11,
granted and the Public Service Commission took awa.
free service to the city when it changed its rates, a11 01:
ing the city a credit of $9,907 .00. The court upheld tti,
cancellation of free senice to the city, and in its rufa.
made the following statement:
"In this connection it is also well to remem~
that there are many decisions emanating from1t
spectable courts of last resort in which it is hel.
that the state can under no circumstances Sll!
render its goyermncntal function of regulatin1;
the rates for public utilities' service at any ani:
all times to the end that rates shall be just an1
fair to all, and that no one can be permitted 11:
obtain an advantage whether for a short or fol
a long period of time and whether contractua:I
or otherwise."
1

Again, we see by the law as expressed by this cour
in the City of St. George case that it has been the ae
clared policy of this State that the regulation of rali·
for public utilities' service is a governmental functior
which cannot be surrendered or suspended by a cil!
council or a state regulating agency. The court further
held that municipalities cannot enter into binding cDL
tracts regarding rates for services rendered to the publir
for the reason that the right to regulate and fix rate·
cannot be surrendered in the absence of constitutiona'
or statutory authority. The policy announced in botf,
the Britmmitt case and City of St. George case has beeti
in force in this State for many years and is still th
law of the State of Utah.
28
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1

Another interesting Utah case is that of F jeldsted
v. Ogden City, 83 Ut. 278, 28 P.2d 144, in which our
Supreme Court stated:
"The power to fix reasonable rates for the
commodity of service is in the board of commissioners, and by the constitution it is under a duty
to operate the system and supply water at reasonable rates. Constitution, Art. 11, § 6. The
board of comm,issioners may not by contract,
restrict or curtail the powers of future boards to
determine and to fix reasonable rates." (Emphasis added) .

There are cases from other jurisdictions which have
1: ruled on this matter the same as this Honorable Court.
: In the case of West Caldwell v .Caldwell, 26 N ..J. 9,
138 A.2d 402, the court stated:
"A municipality cannot bind itself by perpetual contract of unreasonable duration, unless
by legislative sanction. . . . where, as here, the
subject matter of the contract bears an legislative
or governmental function of local subdivisions
of government, involving the exerci.se of police
power in the vital area of health and sanitation
in fulfillment of the public need attendant on
growth in population and new and different land
uses and the expansion of old uses."
A case from a sister state whose arid nature is
similar to that of Utah, involving this problem, is that
of Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22 lVyo. 212, 137 P. 876,
, wherein the plaintiff claimed title to water by adverse
use for 24 years as against the City of Cheyenne. The
court in that case says:
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"VVe have 110 express statutory provision co1.
ing or conferrmg the right to acquire titlt
municip3:1 yr?perty uy, adverse user as aga~
~he mum.c1p~1ny, wh.ich propert¥ is held bJ
w trust for its znlwbtiants, and in such case
riyht is denied by the yreat weiyht of authurir
Citing authority applying the rule to lands
streets. The court goes on to say:
1

'·Such, we think, is the better reasoning, a·
is ~upported by the great weight of author.·
and to which many courts have in later cases,
ceded, although a contrary doctrine had b~
announced in earlier decisions. The principle
applicable in the case before us, for it may \Ii~
equal propriety be said that the city of Cheyenr1
in the matter of acquiring and holding the ri:r1
to the use of water for the benefit of the 1d1 [
public, acts as the agent of the state in exercisu~;
within the provisions of its charter and the stat,I
tory law, government.al functions and powe~\
and as already stated, the securing of water su1
cient not alone for its present but such as n:
be necessary for its future inhabitants was ar
is within its governmental powers. Upon the fat
alleged we 'are of the opinion that plaintitl
theory of title by adverse user is untenablt
(Emphasis added) .
In the case of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water{'
209 Cal. 105, 287 P. 47 5, the court says:
"It may be stated as a general rule that~'.!
invason of righ~s. of property ~vhich. are heh~~;I
public or mumc1pal corporat10ns m perpe . 1
trust for public uses can be held sufficient ··.I
furnish the basis of defense based solely upi
prescription.

30
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"In the case of \T ernon Irrigation Co. v. Los
Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 972, it was stated,
with special reference to the rights to the waters
of the Los Angeles river which the city had
derived from the pueblo of Los Angeles, that the
waters of all rivers were under the Spanish and
Mexican rule, public property, for the use of
the inhabitants. If this be true, it necessarily
follows that the public right and public trust
which the pueblo and its successor, the city of
San Diego, had in these waters in no respect
differed from those other public rights and properties which the state and its various subdivisions
and agencies possess and administer; that it has
been uniformly held that such public rights cannot be lost nor the public trust as to their administration and ea:ercise be destroyed either by adverse possession or by latches or by other negligence on the part of the agents of the state or
municipality who may from time to time be invested with the duty of their protection and administration.
"The court found there were not facts upon
which to base an estoppel in the usual case."
"Even if it were conceded that a right based
upon estoppel could arise by virtue of mere acquiescence in its assertion as between private
persons, we are satisfied that no such claim of
right could come into being as against a municipal corporation, founded upon its mere acquiescence or that of its officials in the diversion by
any number of upper appropriators or even of
upper riparian owners of the waters of a stream
to the use of which such public or municipal corportion was entitled a.~ a portion of its public
rights and properties held in perpetual trust for
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public .use. The gene.ral rule upon this subjeei 3~
stated m 10 Cal. J ur1s., page 650, and cases cil R
(Emphasis added) .
t.

m

In Reclamation District No. 833 v. Amerin
Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74, 285 P. 688, the court heldlli
an easement in a canal of a drainage district could
be acquired by adverse use as a private right may Ii
be acquired in property of a public corporation derott
to public use.

gi

11,

In Patton v. City of TVilmington, 169 Cal. 5:1
147 P. 141, the court says:
"Possession under adverse claim of title
land devoted to public use at the time, is wholi:
ineffectual, not only upon the public use or ea11'
ment, but also upon the title to the soil, or lanrJ:
including the public easement and every suborrl1I
nate estate, as well."
\
The court quotes from Archer v. Salinas, 93 Ca: 1
51, 28 P., at page 841:

I

"The p:operty de~icated has beco~e ~uliu I
property, impressed with the use for wh1cl: it"'.'
dedicated, and neither can the public divert 1'
from that use, nor can it be lost by adverse P8'
. "
sessrnn.
In Ames v. San Diego, 101 Cal. 394, 35 P. lOilol
it is said that land held by a city in trust for a publii
01
use " 'cannot be alienated by the city, and the title
· drer'P
the public thereto cannot be lost by a possess10n a ··
to the city.' "

I'

.
.
C
D 1 e 171 (:1.
In Central Pacific Railway o. v. oa[J ,
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32, 151 P. 663, the court refers to Northern Pacifiic
Railway v. Towrnsend, 19 U.S. 267, 47 L.Ed. 1044,
in which a grant of a 400 foot right of way had been

granted by Congress to the railroad as follows :

"In the last named case the court declared the
rule to be that the estate granted in the strip
designated as a right of way was an estate in fee
for a special public purpose, subject only to reverter at the instance of the United States if the
public use was not properly maintained, that the
railroad company could not alienate any part of
the right of way so as to interfere with the full
exercise of the franchise granted. Referring to
the claim of Townsend to a title by prescription,
the court said:
" 'It is evident that to give such efficacy to a
statute of limitations of a state as would operate
to confer a permanent right of possession to any
portion thereof upon an individual for his private
use would be to allow that to be done by indirection which could not be done directly, and that
the possession by individuals of portion_s of the
right of way cannot be treated, without overthrowing the act of Congress, as forming the
basis of an adverse possession which may ripen
into a good title as against the railroad company.' " (Emphasis added).

The court in the case of Placer Co. v. Lake Tahoe
Railway & Tramportation Co., 58 Cal. App., 764, 209
P. 90, held that no interest could be acquired by adverse
'. P0ssession in a commons shown on a township plat as
· a common for public use, saying:
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. "It is well settled that where a piece of grouni.
is reserved for or dedicated to public purposli'
and therefore become~ public property, tilli
thereto cannot be acqmred as against the puo[11
by adverse possessio11, and the right of action 11
recover possession of tlle same for the public pur·
poses to which it was dedicated is not subjec\!1,
the statute of limitations, Board of Educatio~
of the City and County of San Francisco 1
Martin, 92 Cal. 200, 28 P. 799."
1

This court's attention is called to the case of 11Iar/i1!
v. City of Stockton, 39 Cal. App. 721, 179 P. 8911
This was a suit to quiet title to a parcel of land througl!
which ran a waterway known as Miner's Channel
used as a drain by the city under a conveyance to 1;
which contained a provision that the grant was upon
the express condition that the city use the premises ai
a waterway and drain only. Plaintiff had occupiei
part of the premises with a building and platform ana
paint shop for 20 years and claimed title by adverst
possession. The court says:
I
"It has been held and decided that no rignli
can thus be acquired in and to the public proi·
erty, or property devoted to a public use, 01
owned by a municipality for public uses. Tn1
mere fact that the municipal officers have been!
either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the pub~'
rights of a. municipality, does not enable. any tre·i.·,
passer thereon to acquire any owne~sh1p tl:er~1~.
or divest the city of one particle of its fee Ill,,,,.
estate involved."
The court further held that plaintiff could no'. I
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I

1

adverse the reversionary interest of the grantor to the
city.
Another most interesting case which involved the
claim of adverse use of city water as against the city
is that of Rowland vs. Kellogg Power & Water Co.,
~3 Idaho 643, 253 P. 840. In answer to the claim of
the water user that he by adverse use had acquired a
right to use city water without paying therefor, the
court stated: " . . . that private ownership of water,
devoted to the domestic use of the inhabitants of a
city, may not be so acquired." In a concurring opinion
one of the justices further stated: "Respondent refused
to pay for the service, and urges that by reason of the
fact that he has received this service gratuitiously for
many years he thereby acquired the right to the use
of the water by adverse user." This contention is not
tenable. A water right can neither be initiated nor
acquired by adverse use from the distributing system
I of a public service corporation. 1 Cal. J ur. 585.
"Respondent claims no right in the system and
' admits that title and ownership thereto rest in appel1 lant (City) . While he claims a water right, under the
1 facts he has nothing more than a right to service, upon
n\ compliance, in common with all other users, with the
1
rules and regulations promulgated by the Public Utili~I ties Commission."
:' '1

1'. \

In view of the foregoing authorities and the law
cited to the court, there should be no question whatsoerer that the abortive attempt of the city council of

I
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Salt Lake City on May 6, 1890, to "grant" for a:
undefined period of time to the Territory free use
City water was null and void and could not be enforct.:
at the time such agreement was entered into, nor couli.
the fact that the City these many years last past h
been serving its water to the State free of charge amouu
to an estoppel which would in any way validate ur
make enforceable such purported contract.
11

:

The cases are legion which hold that a city ma.1.
not lose property held in trust for the benefit of t~i;
residents of such city by adverse use, nor can any sud[
city be estopped to deny the invalidity of any ultt:
1
vires act of prior legislators where such act invo]n;l1
a purely governmental function such as the control ol,
water rates. There is no basis for a defense of lacl16'
nor estoppel since the State cannot in any manner wlwl·
soever show how it has changed its position with ref11
ence to the use of water to its detriment in relia111i
on the alleged contract of the city to furnish free waftr
to the State in perpetuity.
Regardless of all the authorities which hold a'
stated above, there is the further logical argument tlini
since cities in the State of Utah cannot alienate tberr
water rights by any direct action, it would certainlyrur,
contrary to the law if indirectly through adverse me.
the application of estoppel or laches a city could ]oit'
any of its water rights.

The court's attention is called to the fact that : 1
1890 agreement merely provided for the City to furnr)ii i
111
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I

free use of water to the Territory. Nothing was said in
the resolution of the City Council as to how long would
be the duration of this arrangement. The 1926 agreement specifically refers to the perpetual use of free
water by the State and refers back to the 1890 agreement. Whether or not it was the original intent of the
City to supply water free of charge to the Territory
in perpetuity it is certainly an ambiguous and uncertain
aspect of the 1890 arrangement. The courts, in any
event, do not favor contracts which by their terms are
construed to be perpetual and particularly is this true
with regards to a governmental function involving the
exercise of police power such as the protection and
preservation of the necessary water right held in trust
for the benefit of the residents of that city. The case
of West Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra, also deals with
this question. The court in that case stated as follows:
" ... perpetual and contractual performance
is not favored in the law, and a construction affirming a right in perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and peremptory terms."

It may be argued by the appellant that the State
being superior to the City in its governmental status
err .
is not bound by the provisions of Article XI, Section
Ul
· 6of the Utah Constitution. In this regard, the court's
1se.
attention is called to the case of State of New Mexico
Qlt'
t'. City of Aztec, 77 N.M. 524, 424 P.2d 801 (March
6, 1967). This case involved a question as to whether
1
t\ ': ·:r not a constitutional provision, limiting the power
ri~·, \ of acity to contract a debt, applied to a city's indebted.

ia

1
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ness to a state agency. 'l'hc court held that the co
tutional provision did apply to the state and its agtii
and the contract was held to be invalid whereunri
the city had agreed to pay a share of the cost of a shrr:
sewer in connection with a highway project. Tnr
appears to be no logic u:hich would justify exclud!:
this State from the effect of its own constitutioii
provisions and it would, therefore, follow afortiori 1i
any contract entered into lJy this State which viola!
an express provision of its own constitution is null a:..r
11

void.

CONCLUSION

.,,

i
I

In view of the foregoing authorities cited to t1t:
court (and many others of which the court is more ful[
aware than counsel) which support the respon<lenl.
position, it is respectfully submitted that the li'.1
arrangement for the City to provide free use of tic
water to the Territory and that the 1926 agreemer
for the City to provide the free use of additional cir
water in perpetuity to the State are both null and rn:.
and of no legal effect for the reasons set forth herein aL
that the lower court did not err in granting sm111H:ir
judgment for the respondent, which judgment tfi
honorable court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

HOMER HOLl\IGRE>'
City Attorney
LEON A. HALGRE~
Assistant City Attorney
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